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Partisanship and Constituency Influences on Congressional Roll-Call Voting
Behavior in the US House
Abstract
This research examines the factors that influence how members of the US House of Representatives
vote. Party affiliation of the legislator and constituency interests will be the two main independent
variables. The district's constituency characteristics are represented by constituency ideology ('96
Presidential vote for Clinton), percent non-white, region, and the median household education. Three
models are used to measure congressional voting behavior. The first of which is measured by the rating
of the member's vote with the Christian Coalition. The second and third models are derived from the
National Journal Ratings of social and economic liberalism of the member's vote.
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Partisanship and Constituency Influences on Congressional Roll-Call
Voting Behavior in the US House
This research examines the factors that influence how members of the US House of Representatives vote. Party affiliation of the legislator and
constituency interests will be the two main independent variables. The district's constituency characteristics are represented by constituency ideology
('96 Presidential vote for Clinton), percent non-white, region, and the median household education. Three models are used to measure congressional
voting behavior. The first of which is measured by the rating of the member's vote with the Christian Coalition. The second and third models are
derived from the National Journal Ratings of social and economic liberalism of the member's vote.
Literature Review
Two of the main factors influencing the vote of legislators are party ties and constituency interests. Many scholars have examined the influence of'
both of these factors. Most have agreed that party is the strongest predictor of member's voting behavior, however, some have focused on the
cleavages among different policy dimensions based on partisan influences. Aage Clausen ( 1960) found that party is a consistently strong predictor in
the areas of government management, agricultural assistance, and social welfare; party is a weak predictor of international involvement and levels of
support for civil liberties. This research will examine the cleavages among social liberalism, economic liberalism, and the Christian Coalition ratings.
Robert Erikson and Gerald Wright (1992) found that House member.,; depart considerably from party norms. They concluded that members hold
onto their seats by offering their constituencies ideological representation, even when it conflicts with their party's positions, They assumed that the
district presidential vote would reflect the constituency's ideology. William M. Leogrande and Alan S. Jeydel (1997) did find district presidential
election results to be the best proxy for constituency ideology. Erikson and Wright's research showed that as the district vote for the '88 Democratic
presidential nominee Dukakis increased, the liberalism of the representative also increased.
Other constituency characteristics have also been found to influence the voting behavior of members. Charles S. Bullock 111 (1995) looked at the
interaction between changing racial composition of districts and legislative behavior. He found that legislators from districts that had a higher
percentage of Blacks in the 102nd Congress were less conservative than the previous
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Congress. David Holian, Timothy Krebs, and Micheal Walsh (1997) analyze the effect constituency opinion and Ross Perot had on the roll-call vote
for NAFTA in the US House. Their results showed that as levels of income an education increased, support for NAFTA increased. I expect these
constituency characteristics (race, income, and education) to have a positive impact on social and economic liberalism ratings and a negative impact
on the Christian Coalition scores.
Tricia Dailey (1996) examined the incumbent's party, 1988 district-level presidential vote, race, education, and income to "analyze their independent
and collective effect on the representative's frequency of supporting the Christian Coalition agenda" (23). She found that party affiliation was an
extremely important factor. Also, most of the independent variables had a significant impact on the dependent variable. However, race was found to
be statistically insignificant,
Hypotheses
In this analysis, the following hypotheses are tested:
H 1: Democrats will have higher social and economic liberalism ratings than Republicans, while the opposite will be true for the Christian Coalition
ratings.
H 2: As the 1996 district Presidential vote for Clinton increases, the social and economic liberalism ratings will also increase and the tendency to vote
with the Christian Coalition will decrease.
H 3: As the percentage of non-Whites in a district increases, the social and economic liberalism ratings will also increase and the probability of
voting with the Christian Coalition will decrease.
H 4: The higher the percentage of median college-educated individuals within a district, the higher the social and economic liberalism rating and the
more likely the representative will not vote with the Christian Coalition agenda.
H 5: Representatives from districts of states in the Midwest and Northeast will have higher social and economic liberalism ratings and will be le
likely to vote along Christian Coalition lines than in the West and South.
Data
A multiple regression model is employed using the impact of seven independent variables (partisanship of the representative, region, percent
non-White, median education, and 1996 district Presidential vote for Clinton) on three dependent variables (social and economic liberalism and the
Christian Coalition ratings).National Journal ratings for the social and economic liberalisin of each representative (based on a scale from 0-100) were
obtained from The Almanac of American Politics. The National Journal rates each
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congressman's social and economic liberalism based on overall roll-call voting. The Christian Coalition rating is also measured on a scale from 0-100
and is based on the member's voting frequency of supporting the Christian Coalition agenda.
The measurement of partisanship, as an independent variable, was the only member-specific variable. Each representative was coded 0 for
Republican and I for Democrat.
All of the socio-economic characteristics of the districts were obtained from The Almanac of American Politics. The percentage of non-Whites in the
district was obtained by subtracting percent White in the district by 100. The median college educational level of the district is also included in the
model. Median income of the district was obtained for this research, but because of a high correlation with education level (.73) it was left out of the
final model. Also, when included in the multiple regression models, it was not significant at the .10 level. Region was broken down into four areas
(Midwest, Northeast, West, and South) with the South as a dummy variable. The final constituency characteristic is the ideology of the district. To
represent the ideology of the district, the percent votes for Clinton was divided by the sum of percent votes for Clinton and Dole to obtain the percent
district vote for Clinton absent third-party candidates.
Results
Table I shows the results for the three models (social and economic liberalism and the Christian Coalition). The three models explain similar
percentages of the variation. For economic liberalism, 79% of the variation is explained versus 78% of the variation for social liberalism and 81% for
the Christian Coalition. The strongest variable in all three models is the party affiliation of the legislator and it is significant at the .00 1 level,
However, the partisanship variable is stronger in the economic liberalism model (.69) than in the social liberalism (.59) or Christian Coalition model
(-.65). Also, the beta weights for the rest of the constituency characteristic variables are greater for the social liberalism and Christian Coalition
models than the economic liberalism model. The only other variable statistically significant in the economic liberalism model is the '96 presidential
vote, while all the variables are significant to at least the .05 level for the social liberalism and Christian Coalition models. Party affiliation is a
stronger predictor in the economic liberalism model than in the other two models (relative to the other variables) while constituency characteristics
are explaining more of the variation in the social liberalism and Christian Coalition models than in the economic liberalism model.
Looking closely at the constituency characteristics further shows differences between the models. First, constituency ideology, the 1996 Clinton
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Table I
Party Affiliation and Constituency Influences on Representatives'
Voting Behavior

Economic

Social

Liberalism
Adjusted R square
F value
Partisanship
'96 Clinton Vote
'YO Non-white
Education
Midwest
Northeast
West

Christian
LiberalismCoalition

0.79**
195.260
0.69**
0.24**
0.050
0.000
0.040
0.050
0.000

0.78**
185.440
0.59**
0.34**
0.07*
0.14**
0.10**
0.14**
0.04

0.81**
-0.65**
-0.29**
-0.09*
-0.14**
-0.05*
-0. 11**
-0.030

*Significant at the .05 level
**Significant at the .001 level
Note: The Coefficient listed for each of the variables is the standardized regression coefficient (beta weight).
vote, is significant at the .001 level for both the social liberalism and economic liberalism models and the Christian Coalition model. Also, it is the
second strongest variable for all of the models. As the district vote for Clinton in the 1996 election increases, the social and economic liberalism of
the representative increases and the likelihood of voting with the Christian Coalition decreases. Therefore, hypothesis 2 is supported. However,
constituency ideology's beta weight is greater for social liberalism (.34) than the Christian Coalition (-.29) and economic liberalism (.24).
Representatives are more likely to respond to constituency ideology and go against their party affiliation for social issues than economic issues and
the Christian Coalition agenda.
The data for race supports hypothesis 3. The percentage of non-Whites in the district is significant at the .05 level for social liberalism and the
Christian Coalition. The beta weights are not very strong relative to the other variables in tile equation for social liberalism (.07), the Christian
Coalition (-. 09), or for economic liberalism (05).
The third strongest variable in the social liberalism and Christian Coalition model is tile percent college educated in the district, which is significant
at the .00 1 level. The beta weight is the same for both social liberalism (. 14) and Christian Coalition (-. 14) except in opposite directions. The data
also shows that education has no statistically significant impact upon economic
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liberalism. The data for the other two models indicates support for the hypothesis. The higher the percentage of college-educated constituents, tile
lesser the likelihood that their representative will vote with the Christian Coalition and the greater the likelihood they will have a higher social
liberalism rating.
In the social liberalism model, both the Northeast and Midwest regions are significant at the .00 1 level with beta weights of. 14 and. 10 respectively.
The West is not significant at the. 10 level and has a smaller beta weight than the Northeast and Midwest with .05. In the Christian Coalition model,
tile Midwest and Northeast regions are both significant at the .05 and .00 1 level respectively. The beta weights are slightly less than in the social
liberalism model with the Midwest at -.05 and the Northeast at -. 11. These findings fit with the fifth hypothesis: representatives from the Northeast
and Midwest will have higher social liberalism ratings and will be less likely to vote with the Christian Coalition agenda than those from the West
and South. Additionally, representatives from the Northeast have the highest ratings, while those from the South have the lowest. In the economic
liberalism model, the Northeast also has the largest beta weight among the regional dummy variables (05). However, it is not significant at the .10
level. In fact, the Midwest region is also not significant at the. 10 level. In other words, the data shows that region has no statistical significance on
economic liberalism among representatives,
Conclusion
Representation is a complex phenomenon. It is difficult to sort out the voting behavior of legislators. One question asks whether or not members are
following their constituency opinions. Another asks whether or not voters are selecting for constituency characteristics in the first place. In all three
models the party affiliation variable was the greatest predictor, followed by constituency ideology, and finally by the socio-economic characteristics
of the district. After party affiliation, representatives respond to constituency ideologies and then to their social makeup.
Partisanship of the member and constituency variables have differing effects on the social and economic liberalism and Christian Coalition models.
For economic liberalism, the only variable besides partisanship of the member that is significant is the district vote for Clinton in 1996. The social
liberalism model and the Christian Coalition model are also strongly associated with partisanship. The constituency characteristic variables are all
significant at the .001 level except percent non-Whites, which is significant at the .05 level. Consequently, the social liberalism model and the
Christian Coalition model, more than the economic liberalism model, suggest a greater influence of constituency interests on the member's votes.
Members cater to constituency preferences the most when dealing with social issues.

34

Greg Crowe and Elizabeth Ann Eberspacher
Bibliography

Bullock, Charles S. 1995. "The Impact of Changing the Racial Composition of Congressional Districts on Legislators' Roll-Call Behavior."
American Politics Quarterly 23:141-57.
Clausen, Aage. 1960. "Party Voting in Congress." 274-279.
Clucas, Richard A. 1997. "Party Contributions and the Influences of Cam
paign Committee Chairs on Roll-Call Voting." Legislative Studies
Quarterly 22:179-193.
Dailey, Tricia. 1996. "The Effects of Political and Demographic Variables on Christian Coalition Scores." Res Publica 1996, Illinois Wesleyan
University, 23-26.
Erikson, Robert S., Gerald C. Wright, and John P. McIver. 1993. Statehouse
Democracy: Public Opinion in the American States. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Holian, David B., Timothy B. Krebs, and Micheal H. Walsh. 1997. "Constituency
Opinion, Ross Perot, and Roll-Call Behavior in the US
House: The Case of the
NAFTA." Legislative Studies Quarterly 23:369-87.
Jeydel, Alana S. and William M. LeoGrande. 1997. "Using Presidential Election
Returns to Measure Constituency Ideology." American
Politics Quarterly 25:318.
Snyder, James M. Jr. 1996. "Constituency Preferences: California Ballot Propositions,
1974-90." Legislative Studies Quarterly 21:463-83.
Ujifusa, Grant and Micheal Barone. 1994. The Almanac of American Politics. Washington D.C.: National Journal.

